The return of Spanish democracy

Rene L Gonzalez Berrios*

The surprise election of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and the 
Socialists (social democrats) in Spain, following the March 13 
train terrorist attacks, has been disconcerting for some, a joy 
to others. The real question is what does Spain's election 
represent — a victory for the terrorists (as argued by right-
wing spokesmen in America, [and Australia]) or the return of 
Spanish democracy?

One aspect of the whole election is uncontroversial — the 
conservative Popular Party (the party of outgoing Prime Minister 
Aznar) was headed for a win at the polls prior to the March 13 
attacks. Virtually all informed opinion in Spain and abroad 
agrees that the bombings (and the subsequent attempt by Aznar's 
government to ascribe blame to ETA, the Basque Separatist group) 
had important consequences for Spanish politics. 

First, the bombings produced divergent reactions from different 
sectors of Spanish society. Clearly, a large portion was 
mobilised to either change their previous support of the Aznar 
Government and vote Socialist, or leave their usual apathy and 
vote.

It wasn't the dedicated Socialist base that gave the election to 
Zapatero; it was either "independents" or members of other 
parties changing their vote. The Socialists were slated to lose 
handily to the Popular Party a few days before the bombings, 
which proves that a major population-electoral shift was produced 
by the bombings.

Aznar has much to take blame, regarding the lost election. First, 
it was his support of Bush's Iraq War, opposed by 90 percent of 
the Spanish population, which produced the highly volatile social 
divisions making the Socialist victory possible and the political 
incentives by otherwise "apathetic" voters to come out and vote 
Socialist.

Disenchantment

Much like Bush in the US, Aznar has shaken the otherwise 
calculable electoral logic of his society. Those that could be 
counted on to be Popular supporters no longer could be, and those 
counted on never to vote, could be the real spoilers of the new 
election. Secondly, the vote also reflected last-minute 
disenchantment and repudiation of Aznar's attempt to ascribe 
blame of the March 13 bombings to ETA.

The claim was a rather transparent attempt to cater to the usual 
Spanish indignation with usual ETA attacks, and was made hollow 
by subsequent denials of responsibility by ETA, and by the 
circumstances of the bombing.

The general feeling in Spain was that ETA picked military or 
government targets, attempting to avoid civilian casualties. 
March 13's wanton massacre of civilians and its intended 
targeting of them was simply not congruent with an ETA attack.

Later evidence began to surface of an Al-Qaida admission of 
responsibility, and the participation of several individuals, 
some with Al-Qaida ties. The doubt produced by the 
inconsistencies of the Aznar Government's claim engendered a 
back-lash. In some reports, several voters were quoted as stating 
that they had not planned to vote, but that Aznar's deception 
regarding the March 13 bombings inspired them to go out and vote.

More intelligent

Aznar played his poker hand thinking he could convince the 
Spanish population to be indignant with ETA, and cater to 
patriotism, much like Bush had done after 9-11. To Aznar's 
horror, the Spanish people proved themselves more intelligent 
than their American counterparts. The appeal to patriotism 
quickly became hollow, and cost the Popular Party the election.

Which leaves the question to be answered: What does the Spanish 
election of 2004 mean, in more historical terms? The positions 
can be concretised (with some necessary simplification) into two 
opposing camps — those that view the Spanish election as a 
capitulation of the Spanish population to terrorism, and those 
that view the Spanish election as the logical endgame for regimes 
who survive and thrive on the manipulation of information and 
deception of their populaces.

Popular "right-wing in the closet" TV show host Bill O'Reilly has 
emerged as one of the early proponents of the first theory, 
calling the Spanish election a "great victory for Al-Qaida". For 
him and others, the Spanish election sent the message to Al-Qaida 
that terrorism could have rewarding consequences. The implied 
message was that the Spanish population lacked "backbone", that 
the proper stance would have been to adopt the internationally-
abhorred arrogant unilateralism of President Bush's "War on 
Terrorism". 

The theory could only be made logical if one believes the 
necessary "prior assumption": that the terrorists hate us, not 
because of social, political, religious, or cultural grievances 
and contexts, but because they hate our very existence, society, 
traditions, and way of life.

If that was the "prior assumption" of the theory, then the 
logical conclusion is that one could not "back-down" and 
"capitulate" to Al-Qaida terrorism, by supporting the "softer" 
party in Spain, the Socialists. The only remedy to Al-Qaida 
"hatred of our very existence" was to adopt the Bushist doctrine 
of "bringing terrorism to the terrorists", and voting for the 
Spanish party that would continue a policy of confrontation — 
the Popular party. Negotiation was not an option. Case-closed.

For opponents of the "prior assumption" of the current, 
confrontational foreign policy approach to Al-Qaida terrorism, 
the logic did not run that Spain needed to adopt Bushist 
unilateralism. Thus, alternatives were possible, alternatives 
proposed, presumably, by the Socialist Party of Spain. The 
Spanish election was not a capitulation of the Spanish people, 
nor a victory for Al-Qaida. Quite the contrary.

Victory for democracy, openness and truth

The Spanish election was a victory for democratic rule, openness, 
and truth, and a setback for Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida thrives on 
violent confrontation. It renews itself through the recruitment 
of disaffected individuals in various parts of the world, 
necessitating violence from its enemies to effect further 
recruitment.

In simple terms, a "Great Satan" that does not place armed forces 
in Third World nations, exploit the natural resources of those 
nations, and implement an imperialist foreign policy, does not 
make a persuasive case for Al-Qaida recruitment.

It simply would not be worth it for regular people to join Al-
Qaida, give up their lives and families, and join a "holy war" 
against a country that did not perpetuate any meaningful harm to 
them.

Much like the Nazis, Al-Qaida is headed by ideological, religious 
fanatics that prey on the fears, anger, and resentment of regular 
individuals. However, the ideologues, like the Nazis without the 
German nation, would be powerless to mobilise their ideology and 
fanaticism in the absence of a socio-political context which 
engendered fear, hatred, and resentment.

Without Western colonialism, neo-colonialism and support of 
Israeli apartheid in Palestine, Al-Qaida ideologues would be a 
rag-tag group of loonies, shouting hatred of the West, but 
powerless to convince their peers to join their "Jihad".

This theory has often been referred to as "fighting the 
mosquitoes through draining the swamp". The Bushist foreign 
policy was rightly condemned, under the perception that it would 
increase Al-Qaida terrorism, hatred of America, and further 
violence. In simple terms, it was to help "fill the swamp" rather 
than drain it.

The evidence is pretty conclusive. Iraq, an otherwise secular 
Muslim nation without much incidence of the type of social 
divisions plaguing countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and 
other Arab/Muslim nations, is now fraught with daily terrorism. 
Bush's war brought that terrorism to Iraq. It destabilised a 
social order that hindered Islamic fanaticism without proposing a 
workable alternative, a fear prophecied by anti-war opponents.

The Spanish people recognised this reality, and voted 
accordingly. Although American imperialism is long a factor of 
world politics, the last three and a half years have made it 
brash, brazen, and "in your face". The need to oppose it 
resolutely has never been greater.

The Spanish people, faced with the reality of increasing 
terrorism, a deceptive and unresponsive government, and the 
possibility of further years of Spanish collusion in a failed, 
neoconservative-imperialist foreign policy course that would be 
destined to lead to new "Madrid bombings", gave the Popular Party 
a kick in their behinds.

The Spanish election was the return of Spanish Democracy, a 
precious commodity that had been sidelined, shamefully, at the 
time of Aznar's commitment to Bush's war (despite 90 percent 
opposition). From that moment on, Aznar's government had become 
illegitimate and surviving only on the manipulation of 
information and deception of the populace.

The deception simply ended with the Spanish election, when the 
Spanish people decided the "prior assumption" of Bushist 
unilateralism did not explain Al-Qaida terrorism, that the war on 
Iraq had not "drained the swamp", that violence and force were 
not defeating terrorism, and that the government's actions from 
its commitment to the war and on, were manifestations of a 
deceptive government, intent on perpetuating its control at the 
cost of Spanish lives, treasure, and reputation.

Faced with this realisation, the Spanish people opted to bolt the 
Bush imperialist boat, and chart a new course toward a more sane 
foreign policy. It was at the same time a rational decision, but 
also a cathartic new beginning. Spain need not follow 
Washington's rule anymore.

The hope of this author is that the people of Britain, Australia, 
and America come to similar realisations, hopefully without the 
need of another "Madrid bombing". The logic of the "prior 
assumption" (that terrorists hate us, not for political reasons, 
but simply because we exist) is faulty, the neoconservative-
Bushist-imperialist "medicine" to confront this "reality" has 
been faulty and a failure, and its continuation will not stop 
terrorism.

The Spanish election could be recorded in history as the moment 
where Spain "capitulated" to Al-Qaida, while the West, almost 
romantically, fought on, or it can be recorded as the moment that 
one of the "coalition of the bribed" came to the sober and 
rational realisation that the foreign policy it had been 
following had failed miserably. 

The coming elections in England, Australia, and the United States 
will tell whether or not the British, Australian, and American 
publics have had enough of their own ideologues, or if they wish 
further useless, hopeless, and unending confrontation.

For their part, the Spanish people have already decided how to 
confront Al-Qaida: by emphasising to the Arab and Muslim world 
that they do not wish harm on their peoples, and that they simply 
wish to live in peace with them, a tactic sure to make 
recruitment of terrorism against Spain more difficult for Al-
Qaida. Simply put, the "90 percent" is back in power, and that's 
a return to true Spanish democracy.

* * *

*Gonzalez is a Doctoral Candidate in Comparative Politics at 
the University of Massachusetts. He may be contacted by email 
at:renegonzalez7@hotmail.comPublished with kind permission of 
Rene L Gonzalez Berrios) 2004