Row over defence intelligence grows
Peter Mac Spin-doctoring over issues concerning Australia's intelligence gathering has once again landed the Howard Government in hot water. The Government had previously commissioned a report by lawyer and former naval officer Captain Martin Toohey into the effectiveness of the activities of government agencies that gather and process military intelligence. To the government's horror, Toohey's report found serious weaknesses, in particular the tendency for intelligence personnel to frame their reports in a manner bound to find favour with the government of the day. After receiving his report, the government undertook a "fishing expedition" for a report that would better suit their purposes: A second report confirmed the conclusions drawn by Collins and Toohey., but this was also rejected in favour of a third report by Colonel Richard Tracey, which claimed that Toohey's report was without foundation. Toohey claims that Tracey hadn't bothered to contact him and had not read transcripts of interviews conducted by Toohey. Tracey himself does not appear to have conducted any such interviews. Toohey commented: "I believe there is no basis for the Tracey report. It is merely personal advice." Nevertheless, in a transparent ruse, the government accepted the Tracey version, describing the discrepancies between the two reports as simply a result of "differing opinions". The affair has revealed the Government as totally cynical and morally bankrupt. However, it has also highlighted major changes emerging within the Australian intelligence services which involve issues of profound importance for the Australian people. High-level intelligence is a most important political weapon, which is intended to serve the interest of the government that gathers it, and the class whose interests that government serves. One of the most embarrassing revelations arising from the recent open letter sent by a defence intelligence officer, Lance Collins, is that there is a clique of members of Australia's Defence Intelligence Orgainisation who are sympathetic to Indonesia. Their views correspond to those that have prevailed among the major political parties since General Suharto's bloody neo-fascist coup in Indonesia in the early 1960s. Specific reference was made in Collins' letter to the 1999 situation in East Timor, in which post UN plebiscite violence was clearly and accurately forecast. The Howard government failed to act until the massacres were well underway, and then only with greatest reluctance as the principal member of a UN taskforce. Howard's "yes men" The modification of intelligence reports to make them acceptable to a government's political views is attributed to being a result of appointing intelligence officers with a background in policy formation and the diplomatic service. The performance of these officers is undoubtedly supported by the Government. They are fully conscious of the government's requirements, share their views and are only too pleased to shape their reports accordingly. A prime example of this is the material used to back up allegations that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to the invasion by US-led forces. The Government is cultivating organisations of "yes men". It is abundantly clear that it wants a public service, including the intelligence agencies, that will produce material lending credibility to its policies. It is also clear that the Howard Government is prepared to use this material to transfer the blame onto members of those agencies when things go terribly wrong, as is happening in Iraq. Let's not forget the hapless Mick Keelty, head of the Australian Federal Police, who was publicly humiliated and forced to recant when he stated that Australia now has a heightened danger of becoming a terrorist target as a result of the Howard Government's support of the war in Iraq. The treatment of Captain Toohey, including commissioning reviews of his report, bears this out. Alienating the intelligence service, defence forces There is now an increasing tendency for government officials to publicly state their differences with the government. Notable recent examples include Captain Toohey and former Office of National Assessments officers Andrew Wilkie, as well as Lieutenant-Colonel Lance Collins and defence intelligence operative Jane Errey, both from the Defence Intelligence Organsiation. Errey, a Ministerial briefer, claims she was sacked for refusing to write a report that exaggerated the threat posed to the West by the former Saddam Hussein regime. These people's decision to speak out is a direct result of the Government's practice of blaming catastrophes such as the Iraq war on faulty intelligence and, by implication, poor performance by intelligence organisations and personnel. This practice is not only duplicitous; it is also very unwise. The government ultimately depends heavily on the support of the intelligence services and the public service generally. They want "yes men" to provide them with material to back up their more unpopular activities, but they also need competent professionals and operatives to provide them with accurate and objective information. It is these people who are likely to feel the greatest resentment, both individually and collectively, at being asked to lie or cover for the Government. And this resentment is almost guaranteed to result in them speaking out. Further scandals are emerging to dog the government. Some 200 former and serving defence personnel are considering taking a legal class action against the Government. They claim that their behaviour, which in many cases comprised speaking out against unjust treatment, resulted in their being dismissed from the service on the totally spurious grounds of ill health. More and more people close to the design and delivery end government's disastrous military policies are speaking out. Their courage and their contribution to the campaign to rein in this aggression are to be welcomed And as if that was not enough, there is now a major scandal brewing involving radio announcer and right-wig rabble rouser Alan Jones. The Prime Minister did not deny he had spoken to Jones, but stated that he had "no recollection" of a discussion with Jones about Flint's appointment. In the circumstances many people will see this as just another attempt by "honest John" to weasel out of another unpleasant and politically embarrassing scandal.