Private armies, private fortunes, public shame
Bob Briton Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman was a regular visitor to Australia in the 1980s. The guru of supply side economics and "monetarism" was riding the wave of the right-wing ideological offensive that is still with us today. His "Chicago Boys" followers had just been put to work on the Chilean economy by the fascist dictator General Augusto Pinochet. The need to assist the privatising and deregulating efforts of the Hawke Government and various state governments brought him to our shores. During one of his visits, the iconoclastic promoter of "small government" and private enterprise was charming a lunchtime gathering at the National Press Club in Canberra. A journalist had just asked a question that he, no doubt, thought had found a chink in the professor's armour. "Would you advocate the privatisation of our nation's armed forces?" There was some hearty laughter in the audience based on the belief — still widespread at the time — that it would be ludicrous to entrust something so basic and sensitive as national defence and the pursuit of foreign policy to bodies driven, above all, by the need to turn the biggest buck possible. "Certainly!" came the reply. Friedman proceeded to advocate the contracting out of these functions as soon as possible. The professor lost the confidence of much of his audience that day with the outrageous suggestion that the state should trust corporations to run private armies. To any reasonable person, the possibility that such corporations would begin to act in their own interests and against the public interest was too obvious to be ignored. Fast forward to Iraq Today in Iraq, there are several dozen groups with more than 20,000 employees providing "security" to both the military and the private sector. The recruits to these companies receive many times their usual salary in their home countries and the companies that hire them are making profits not seen since the early days of the dot-com era. Iraq is a corporate El Dorado. Companies favoured by the Bush Administration, such as Bechtel and Halliburton, are going about their job of rebuilding Iraq's oil, transport and other infrastructure in the most wasteful (and profitable) way imaginable. They are awarded contracts on a "costs plus" basis, i.e. they are reimbursed for their expenses and paid an additional percentage of whatever they spend. Such a contract is a licence to overcharge. This system has led to a situation where, on the one hand, US soldiers do not have sufficient bullet-proof vests to go around and sleep in tents at a cost to the tax payer of US$1.39 a day. On the other hand, Halliburton subsidiary KBR will abandon brand new trucks valued at US$85,000 rather than change the oil or repair a tyre and will put its staff up at the five-star Kempinski Hotel at a cost of US$10,000 per employee per month. Military contractors are in the top ranks of those growing fat on the "War on Terrorism". CACI, one of the contractors implicated in the sickening abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison, reported a 37 percent surge in net income last April. For the first 12 months of the occupation, all contracts were evaluated by a group of six men and women in their 20s who were selected on the basis of risumis they posted on the website of a right wing "think tank" called The Heritage Foundation. While the staff of the Defence Contract Audit Agency are supposed to maintain an oversight on these contracts, it is widely recognised that they have no hope — if, indeed, they were ever intended to have such a hope — of overseeing the many contracts being issued. And while the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was supposed to keep the behaviour of mercenaries in check, the whole world now knows that the private military is pretty much a law unto itself. Blurring the lines "Guns for hire", "soldiers of fortune", mercenaries — call them what you will — date back to ancient times. However, in Iraq we are seeing rapid advances toward the fulfilment of Milton Friedman's dream of a modern, private military. The Abu Ghraib scandal lifted the lid on the fact that private companies are now doing some of the most sensitive work previously carried on exclusively by the official US Armed Forces. The previously mentioned CACI and fellow defence contractor Titan were supposed to be providing staff support and translation services respectively at the jail. It turns out that their staff were involved in the interrogation of prisoners and implicated in the torture, rape and in some instances summary execution of detainees. Eyebrows in the traditional US military were raised last year when the "security" contractor Erinys started recruiting large numbers of "guards" from the Free Iraqi Forces, the army group formed by the now out-of-favour Ahmed Chalabi. Erinys now has 15,000 employees and is officially charged with protecting Iraq's oil infrastructure. Another contractor, Aegis, has 75 "close protection teams" of eight men each offering security to the personnel of a host of other private corporations. It will link up with the services of 50 other private "security" firms. A spokesman for the US Army, Major Gary Tallman, told Corpwatch, "Their job is to disseminate information and provide guidance and coordination throughout the four regions of Iraq." With a brief as broad as that, it is small wonder that some of the military top brass are starting to worry about the rise of the private military. They know that the "security" firms now infesting Iraq are not made up of out-of-work nightclub bouncers providing services akin to those offered by Chubb or Wormalds. Who are these people? Liberal commentators in the US regularly write about the "screw ups" of those in charge of handing out defence contracts. The waste and outrageous behaviour of the "security" companies never cease to surprise these scribes. Doubtful outfits keep getting awarded fat, juicy contracts despite the notoriety of the people at the top of them. "Didn't anyone do a Google* on these guys?" is apparently a common refrain. If these people are sincere, it is about time that they faced up to the possibility that very disreputable people are put in charge of important military tasks because of their gruesome track record and not in spite of it. The "security" firms in question are top heavy with former intelligence officers from the armed forces of Western countries and former soldiers of "elite" fighting forces like the UK's Special Air Services (SAS). Jude McCulloch had the following to say in her book Blue Army about the glue that binds this type of unit together: "The all-male SAS is considered 'elite' amongst army units, and ordinary soldiers tend to view SAS soldiers as 'super-grunts' or 'super-soldiers'. Soldiers generally find killing difficult because of the strong inhibitions most people have against taking human life. The rare 'natural soldiers', the 2 per cent of the population predisposed towards psychopathic tendencies, are found 'mostly congregating in the commando-type special force [units]'."** Members of this precious two percent have been defecting from their prestigious special forces units after receiving their expensive training (valued at US$3 million in the case of the UK's SAS). They are signing up with one or other of the many private contractors willing to pay them as much as US$250,000 per annum. They have come from the discontinued repressive apparatus of South Africa's apartheid regime — from the Koevoet, a notoriously brutal counterinsurgency arm of the military and the Vlakplaas secret police. They are from the Civil Co-operation Bureaux that assisted Savimbi's UNITA forces in Angola, fed false information to the press and carried out assassinations of leading figures of the African National Congress. They have also come from the CIA and the US Special Forces. Many of these people are rumoured to keep in touch about new adventures at the Special Forces Club at 8 Herbert Crescent in Central London. They can even check in to the Donovan Room, named after "Wild Bill" Donovan, the founder of the CIA's predecessor the Office of Strategic Services. Typical mercenary leader Typical of this latest generation of mercenary leader is Tim Spicer, head of the previously mentioned Aegis Defence Services. Aegis has just been awarded a US $293 million Pentagon contract to coordinate "security" in Iraq. However "Aegis" is only the latest mercenary venture of the irrepressible Brit. The former Lieutenant Colonel of the Scots Guards saw service in the Falklands and was the commander in Belfast of two soldiers convicted in 1992 of the murder of an unarmed 18-year-old Catholic youth named Peter McBride. To this day, Spicer defends the reputations of the convicted killers and of the unit, which had a name for torture in Northern Ireland. He saw service briefly in Gulf War I and was a spokesman for the UN Forces in Bosnia. Spicer left the forces to set up a mercenary outfit called Sandline. Army buddies like Richard "Tarzan" Bethel and Alistair Morrison followed a similar path with their Defence Systems Limited. Morrison subsequently joined forces with Sean Cleary, an apartheid-era official linked to UNITA, to form the huge Erinys concern. Sandline came to the attention of people in our region in 1997 when Papua New Guinea's Defence Forces chief General Jerry Singarok led the protests that brought down Prime Minister Julius Chan. The disgraced PM had given Sandline a $36 million contract to put down the independence struggle on Bougainville. Spicer sized up the Bougainville job when he visited the troubled territory as part of an AusAid delegation. He landed an estimated 170 "security" personnel with their equipment (including attack helicopters!) aboard Antonov 12 and 124 aircraft. Working alongside "peacemakers" from the Pretoria-based Executive Outcomes, the Sandline mercenaries proceeded to attack the people of Bougainville with everything they had. They used chemical weapons and were set to use devastating fuel air bombs and conduct psychological warfare [Operation Oyster] when the PNG General called a halt to the privatisation of his war. Spicer was arrested and detained. The British Embassy intervened to save Spicer's hide on that occasion. It seems the "unorthodox soldier" had walked into a situation he had underestimated in terms of complexity. Not only were the PNG Defence Forces not yet ready to allow the outsourcing of their functions, it seems that future private "peacekeeping" action in the region had already been promised to a US company called Military Professional Resources Inc. Sandline bobbed up next in 1998 in Africa, where around 90 other private armies were busy providing "security". The company was contracted to sell 30 tons of arms to the forces of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the former leader of Sierra Leone. This activity was in contravention of a UN embargo on the sale of arms to both sides of the conflict. Spicer denies having done anything illegal and boasts that he had the co-operation of Craig Murray, a junior staffer at the British Foreign Office, for his exploits. It turns out Spicer had been contracted by an Indian-born Thai national hiding out in Canada who wanted to have his diamond and bauxite mining concessions in Sierra Leone returned to him. This would involve the restoration of the corrupt former President. Spicer carried out his services while the anxious Rakesh Saxena was in detention and awaiting extradition to Thailand to face charges of embezzlement. As well as delivering the arms via the Boeing 727 aircraft of Ibis Air (the air arm of Executive Outcomes), he trained 40,000 of Kabbah's militia fighters. With the collaboration of the Nigerian military, Spicer's side of the war eventually prevailed in 1998. Doug Brooks, head of the mercenary peak council, the International Peace Operations Association, summed things up this way: "Sandline was remarkably effective. Their goal of restoring the democratically elected government was achieved. They maintained a low profile but played a critical role in the success." Spicer, however, was not happy. Other mercenary outfits were doing much better for themselves out of the latter-day scramble for the territory and resources of Africa. Some were getting part of the oil, diamond and other resource wealth that they captured as payment for their services. In 2000, he quit Sandline and left the following note on the company website: "Sandline International wishes to announce that the company is closing down its operations forthwith. The general lack of government support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa, in the absence of effective international intervention, is the principal reason behind Sandline's decision. Without such support the ability of Sandline (and other PMCs) to make a positive difference in countries where there is widespread brutality and even genocidal behaviour is irretrievably diminished." After a number of lower key engagements, the "can do" Spicer now has his men on the ground in Iraq, ready for more philanthropic work, thanks to a US$293 million contract from the Pentagon. Unaccountable by design In his autobiography, Spicer set out this sanitised version of his credo: "Sandline has five basic principles: we only work for legitimate governments, we will do nothing illegal, even for those governments; we will do nothing against key Western nations' foreign policies; we apply First World standards to all our military work, including respect for human rights; and we ensure client confidentiality." It is hard to take much of this seriously in the case of Sandline, its successor or the other PMCs so highly regarded by Tim Spicer. In 2000, US legislators were obliged to pass the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act in response to revelations about the behaviour of Dyncorp in Bosnia. The Virginia-based company was found to have established prostitution rings in the former Yugoslav republic. Employees of the company avoided rape charges because of the jurisdiction conflicts of the case. Incidentally, Dyncorp is now in charge of training the Iraqi police. Last week a private contractor hired by the CIA was indicted by a federal grand jury in North Carolina for the two-day beating of a prisoner who had surrendered in Afghanistan. The prisoner subsequently died. Unfortunately, this example is an exception that proves the rule of immunity for private contractors. In the infamous Abu Ghraib case, while two Marines and one Army reservist have been given prison sentences and six other services members are facing trial, not one of the contractors has been charged. This shielding of the mercenaries is no accident. If the gravy train that is private "security" and other military services is to continue to roll, if more and more of the shameful detail of US and allied foreign policy is to be kept "commercial in confidence", if the vision of giant private corporate armies protecting other giant corporations is to reach its potential, that is how it is how it has got to be.* * * *For readers who are not familiar with the internet, "Google" is the name of a popular search engine for finding information on the internet. b **McCulloch, Jude Blue Army — paramilitary policing in Australia, Melbourne University Press, 2001 Acknowledgements: http://www.warprofiteers.com www.corpwatch.org