The Guardian 22 March, 2006
Covering the sun with a finger
Ramon Sanchez & Parodi Montoto
The US State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs on March 1 released its not very eagerly-awaited 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report during a lengthy press conference.
Initial reactions throughout the world were mostly critical of the annual US exercise, via which that nation holds itself up as the acting anti-drug judge of the rest of the world.
The action by a government whose country has the largest drug market in the world recalls the Biblical refrain of "not seeing the beam in one’s own eye for looking at the straw in another’s."
The report’s first volume is dedicated to the situation of narcotics trafficking and consumption in the world, including Cuba. When reading what it says about Cuba, one gets the impression that it is a document that was executed with two uncoordinated hands: on the one, there are objective elements contributed by experts from US anti-drug agencies; and on the other, there are ill-intentioned judgments seeking to discredit or ignore the efforts and effectiveness of anti-drug actions by the Cuban Government, provided by State Department officials who are obsessed with wiping Cuba off the face of the earth.
They want to hide Cuba’s successes in the eradication of the scourge of drugs, but the truth is so red-hot that it is destroying the hypocrisy and distortions of the State Department’s professional liars.
Thus, subtleties and not-so-subtle affirmations slip through the document, such as "the Cuban Government’s refusal to implement an effective policy of the use of force is encouraging drug traffickers to risk crossing through the island’s territorial waters and airspace," or that "growing trade with Venezuela" is one of the "primary risk factors exposing Cuba to the dangers of drug trafficking;" or that "the effectiveness of drug prevention and interdiction in Cuba comes primarily from its dictatorial and coercive policing methods."
These insinuations contradict alternative concrete information included in the report that clearly identifies the effective efforts and positive results obtained by Cuba in combating drug trafficking, production and consumption. The report could not omit the fact that Cuba "intercepts and destroys drug contraband"; "has a nationally coordinated strategy for maritime and air interception", "the regime’s skill in infiltrating drug production and trafficking networks"; an "aggressive internal program for law enforcement, investigation and prevention of an incipient domestic market"; and "the Cubans are dedicating resources and adopting methods and techniques for improving detection and working to obtain better results in the prevention area".
The report acknowledges the positive results and efforts and resources applied in the operations dubbed Aché (curiously, it changes the name, using a subtly ominous word — Axe, Hacha, bringing to mind the executioner) and Coraza Popular. It also mentions the activities of the National Drug Commission as the central government agency for drug policies, prevention and rehabilitation, as well as the role of the Ministry of the Interior’s National Anti-drug Authorities (DNA) as national coordinator in confronting drug production, use and consumption.
The actions it mentions includes the fact that the DNA and Cuban Customs maintain an active anti-narcotics inspection program in the country’s ports and airports, and even notes the new equipment bought in China and installed in Havana’s port for scanning containers.
It says they have not been able to investigate or learn about the effectiveness of the program and the equipment’s utilisation. (In order to satisfy the curiosity of the report’s authors, we can inform them that the program and the equipment are going very well, thank you.)
With the obligatory conditioning, the report admits that significant volumes of drugs are not produced in Cuba, nor is there corruption among officials involved in anti-drug efforts. While it is not expressed explicitly, it cannot say anything about money-laundering from illegal activities, because all references to Cuba have been eliminated in the report’s second volume, which deals with that issue. That is, given they have nothing bad to say, they prefer to obviate the issue in order not to have to say anything good about Cuba. It is true; there is no money-laundering in Cuba. Our financial and legal institutions have seen to it to immunise us against that plague.
Its real intentions may be found in the report’s final four lines. In spite of Cuba’ successes in combating illegal drugs, the United States has limited collaboration with revolutionary Cuba to a case-by-case basis, but as the report reveals, the reason for that is simply its visceral hatred for the Cuban Revolution. That is demonstrated by the report’s final words on Cuba: "... Cuban officials have professed an interest in developing bilateral agreements with the US Government for combating drug trafficking, terrorism and the contraband of immigrants; however, such agreements are not possible until the Cuban regime abandons its totalitarian nature and its role as a state sponsor of terrorism."
In short, what they’re hoping for is the disappearance of the Cuban Revolution, not illegal drugs.
Granma