FALINTIL — the people's army

by Vic Williams

The attempt to disarm a Falintil unit by an Australian platoon of 
peacekeepers has raised a key issue. Interfet's Commander 
Cosgrove is pressing "in strongest terms" for Falintil to hand in 
their weapons.

An Australian army statement on national radio claimed the 
Falintil were armed civilians, not an army and should not carry 
weapons.

Independence leader and Falintil Commander Xanana Gusmao said the 
anti-Indonesian guerillas should not hand over their weapons.

The issue can only be finally settled when the UN recognises 
Falintil as the army of the Democratic Republic of East Timor 
that declared its independence on November 28, 1975.

It was recognised by a wide range of countries, but not Australia 
or Indonesia.

The new government was first led by President Francisco Zavier do 
Amaral, who deserted to the Indonesians, then by Nicolau Lobato, 
who was Prime Minister in 1975, but later killed in action, and 
then by Xanana Gusmao. He is recognised as leader by the UNO and 
by Falintil.

Falintil is the army of the East Timorese people. On August 11, 
1975, the UDT [Uniao Democratica Timorense] staged a coup, 
apparently under the impression that Indonesia would recognise 
them as an anti-communist government, sympathetic to integration 
with Indonesia.

Led by Lieutenant Rogerio Labao, the Timorese troops of the 
Portuguese Army took over Army Headquarters and began the defeat 
of the UDT coup.

That was the beginning of the Falintil that grew into an 
organised army in the struggle against the Indonesian invasion.

Rogerio Labato was Minister for National Defence in the Republic 
of West Timor and commander of East Timor Liberation Forces 
(Falintil) until the government sent him abroad just before the 
invasion of Dili.

From September to December 1975 he successfully organised the 
resistance to the Indonesian invasion on the border with West 
Timor.

Mari Alkatiri (Minister of State and Political Affairs in 
November '75) told the author that in later '75, with village 
militia there were 80,000 under arms.

In 1977 Rogerio Labato gave an interview on the organisation, 
strategy, tactics and supply of Falintil as an army. The regular 
army was made of all Timorese troops in the Portuguese colonial 
army and all those who had done military service.

They were very mobile, to concentrate for large scale attack and 
for dispersal.

The second level were regional troops who combined with the 
regular troops in their area.

Guerillas operated in a very small areas and coordinated with 
regulars and regionals.

The self-defence forces, a majority of the people, used any 
method to kill the enemy in combination with the other forces. It 
was a people's war and a people's army.

The flexibility and reserve of the total army made it possible to 
work on a defensive strategy, not a positional war. It launched 
many small offensives, with small guerilla attacks, or 
concentrated with a large number when the situation was suitable.

The Indonesians sent a big convoy from Dili along the coast to 
Manatuto. At a very difficult part of the road which winds around 
a steep cliff face, Falintil ambushed it, shot the drivers of the 
front and rear vehicles and hit with the main forces and 
overwhelmed them.

That way they got more arms and ammunition from the enemy.

They learned from the Vietnamese and the Cambodians how to 
capture and destroy tanks, and adopted the techniques used in 
Vietnam against helicopters.

All the Falintil units had political commissars to explain the 
military and political line to the soldiers, that they should 
share food with the people, help those who were sick.

The commissars helped in the literacy campaign.

Fretilin policy on Indonesian prisoners was to re-educate them on 
the aims of Indonesian colonial aggression, and to overcome the 
desire of the people to kill Indonesian prisoners.

Falintil organised its own food supplies with the people.

Each unit had its own gardens, for sweet potatoes, marrows, 
tapioca and rice fields.

Wild beans grow in plenty in the forests, but they had to be 
cooked six or seven times to get rid of the poison.

The Falintil taught people to work collectively. They hunted for 
wild game in the forests with the traditional means, saving 
ammunition.

There is a highly developed traditional medicine and Fretilin 
through Falintil persuaded traditional doctors to share this 
knowledge.

The history of 25 years of struggle shows that Falintil was a 
disciplined and well-trained army.

News from Radio Maubere, the voice of Fretilin was picked up in 
the bush outside Darwin with difficulty.

The Fraser Government made it illegal to listen to it, raided the 
listeners and confiscated the listening sets.

Nevertheless, the news came through and was published in East 
Timor News.

No 1, 24 Feb '77 reported an attack on Darolette with 161 
Indonesian soldiers killed for the loss of five Fretilin. Another 
attack saw 253 Indonesians die and three Fretilin killed.

No 2, 10 March '77 reported 2,094 Indonesians killed 
south-east of Dili in three months. From January '77 to May '78 
Indonesia lost 1,277 soldiers in a series of battles, while 
Fretilin lost 38. This shows the efficiency and skill of the 
Falintil army with one casualty to 40 of the enemy.

By the middle of 1978, with 80 percent of the land under 
Fretilin, the Indonesian losses of 30,000 troops were such and 
the costs so high that some of the Indonesian generals wanted to 
pull out.

It was then that US military advisors and mercenaries went in 
with Indonesian troops.

East Timor News No 36, June '78 saw this as a new 
escalation of the war, Suharto recognising that he could not 
crush the Timorese people.

With greatly increased US air and ground support, they used 
carpet bombing for the destruction of all gardens.

East Timor News No 50, March '79 reported on widespread 
starvation and famine undermining Falintil resistance.

NEVERTHELESS, Falintil, the people's army persisted and the 
Indonesian army and the militia they have created have failed to 
disarm them.

Whatever the motives of Interfet and Cosgrove, they should not 
succeed where an Indonesian army of 100,000 has failed for 25 
years.

Falintil, with more arms, equipment and food, with the local 
knowledge, support of the people and experience, could be vital 
in disarming the militia and restoring peace to East Timor.

The Vice-Commander of Falintil, Taur Matan Ruak, said in a 
statement from Uimori Headquarters in central East Timor on 
October 4 that "any move to disarm Falintil would be an affront 
to the history and dignity of the Falintil who for 24 years have 
protected the people of East Timor during the Indonesian military 
occupation."

Vice-Commander Ruak said the mandate of INTERFET is to disarm the 
militias, provide security and protection for the population and 
provide security and safe passage for the expeditious delivery of 
humanitarian aid. He urged Interfet to keep to its mandate.

"We would be willing to negotiate with Interfet when the last TNI 
[Indonesian] solider has left the territory, but it would be 
conditional, we would like to see the development of an 
appropriate mechanism such as a police force to maintain 
security", said Vice Commander Ruak.

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